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C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000609

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016  
TAGS: [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [MG](#) [IZ](#) [PL](#)  
SUBJECT: FM TELLS AMBASSADOR NSC WILL DECIDE 7TH IRAQ  
ROTATION SIZE

REF: A. STATE 123080

- [1](#)B. ULAANBAATAR 575
- [1](#)C. ULAANBAATAR 553
- [1](#)D. ULAANBAATAR 550

Classified By: Acting DCM Patrick J. Freeman, for reasons  
1.5(B) and (D).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary and comment: Ambassador, accompanied by Polish ambassador, met on August 9 with Foreign Minister Enkhbold to urge Mongolia to reconsider its decision to reduce the 7th rotation to Iraq to a few staff officers. Ambassador noted that Washington welcomes Mongolia's decision to send a 7th rotation, but is disappointed at the late notice, and concerned about the force protection effect at Camp Echo. The Polish ambassador stated that the Mongolia contingent is very important for the security of Polish soldiers and that Mongolia's decision on the rotation is a very important one for his government. Foreign Minister Enkhbold responded that Mongolia's National Security Council would make the final decision at an as yet unscheduled meeting, and that the U.S. and Polish views would be taken into account. He commented that the Cabinet had felt that the 7th rotation could be decided at its level, but that it would "have to listen to the NSC." Comment: Enkhbold's acknowledgement that the NSC will make the final call is a change from his demeanor on July 20 (ref c), which gave no suggestion that the Cabinet decision to make the significant reduction was other than final. While the outcome remains unknown, two of the three members of the NSC (the President and Speaker) have been strong supporters of Mongolia's presence in Iraq, and President Enkhbayar is known to be unhappy both with the reduction and the way that the decision was made. End summary and comment.

[1](#)2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Polish Ambassador Zbigniew Kulak, met with Foreign Minister Enkhbold on August 9. Ambassador stated that Washington had asked her to meet with the Foreign Minister to urge Mongolia to send a 7th rotation which could carry on with the same mission. She drew on ref a points to state that, while the U.S. welcomes Mongolia's decision to send a 7th rotation to Iraq, there is disappointment with the late notice. She noted there would be a significant negative impact on security at Camp Echo, since it is impossible to find replacements for the Mongolia soldiers, who had performed very well in previous rotations.

[1](#)3. (C) Polish Ambassador Kulak noted that he had briefly talked with the Foreign Minister several days ago on the margins of another event. Since then, his government had

suggested that he call on the Foreign Minister with the U.S. ambassador. Kulak stated that the Mongolian contingent is very important for the security of the 2,000 Polish soldiers in Iraq. There had been excellent cooperation between the Polish and Mongolian contingents. A reduction in Mongolia's contingent at Camp Echo, or its end, is a very important issue for the Polish government. He urged the Mongolian government to understand Poland's viewpoint. Ambassador Slutz noted that the Polish forces are more directly affected by the intended Mongolian reduction, but that it also has bearing on Coalition relations as a whole.

14. (C) FM Enkhbold responded that both ambassadors knew about the Cabinet decision which had been made, and which had been based on consultations between MFA and the Ministry of Defense. The Cabinet had supported the suggestion to reduce the number of soldiers, but to still have a few staff officers there. A final decision had yet to be made concerning the details of this decision, such as how many staff would be sent.

15. (C) The Foreign Minister continued that, prior to those details being worked out, the issue would be submitted to Mongolia's National Security Council (note: the President, Speaker, and Prime Minister). Enkhbold expressed uncertainty as to when the NSC would meet, but opined it likely would be in the near future, before the planned vacations of officials. The Foreign Minister reiterated that it is within the authority and power of the Cabinet to make decisions on the details of each rotation but, in this case, the issue would be discussed and a decision made at the NSC level. He assured that Mongolia would not be withdrawing from Iraq. Foreign Minister Enkhbold acknowledged that he had seen the Ambassador's letter of the previous day, and passed it to the President and Speaker. (Note: On August 8, citing MFA

reports that the NSC would meet to discuss the 7th rotation, the Ambassador wrote to the President, Speaker, and Prime Minister, with a copy to the Foreign Minister, attaching a copy of the ref a talking points.) Enkhbold stated that the Cabinet and the NSC would consider the U.S. and Polish points in making the final decision on the 7th rotation.  
SLUTZ